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 Many social problems can be understood as “conceptual caseloads”, e.g., people in poverty, and 
actual programmatic caseloads are a major, specific concern for policymakers and public 
administrators. Thus, a crucial and fairly general concern is how caseloads—whether conceptual or 
programmatic—can be reduced. To address this concern, officials often fall back on politically or 
intuitively attractive ideas—preventing people from entering caseloads, for example. Failure to 
incorporate caseload dynamics, however, may mean prevention and other caseload reduction policies 
will deliver much less than promised, and may cause caseloads to grow. In this paper, we first  show how 
caseload size depends only on the number of entrants to a caseload and the rate at which people leave a 
caseload. With this framework in mind, we then address two common, seemingly appropriate policy 
responses: preventing entrants and hastening leaving. However, we show how too little is now known 
about homeless prevention to pin high hopes on its utility and that some social welfare problems, like 
homelessness, may be too inhospitable for prevention's logic. We then explain how allocating resources 
to hasten leaving is not as straightforward as policymakers have assumed but rather must recognize 
caseload dynamics to avoid unintended growth. We conclude by explaining some limits and opportunities 
in using caseload dynamics for policymaking. 
Keywords: homelessness; dynamics; prevention; caseloads; shelters 
 
1. Introduction 
 One way to think about some public problems is to transform them into caseloads. We can think 
about whether some entity, such as people or households, are in a particular problematic status and 
whether others are likely to enter that status. Poverty, for example, can be thought of as a caseload of 
those households with incomes below the poverty level, and we can imagine a population of households 
whose incomes are likely to fall below that level. One policy concern, then, might be to reduce the size of 
this “conceptual” caseload.  
 This is, of course, a more abstract construction of problems defined by the programmatic caseloads 
of government initiatives, such as those in social welfare: poor families receiving financial assistance; 
children living in foster care; and adults and families living in homeless shelters. A major concern of 
policymakers, public administrators and nonprofit staff is how to manage programmatic caseloads for 
which they are formally responsible, and, frequently, how to reduce their size.  
 Conceptual frameworks for translating caseload concerns into effective management strategies are 
lacking, however. Public officials more commonly fall back on intuitively appealing ideas. To slow the 
number of people going onto foster care caseloads, for example, they establish "family preservation" 
prevention programs. To reduce the number of people in homeless shelters, they provide permanent 
housing for people soon after they become sheltered. But intuitive appeal may not translate into actual 
impact. Social welfare problems have conditions that undermine the effectiveness of prevention. As a 
result, public officials and nonprofits should not be sanguine about how much prevention can slim 
caseloads. And reducing caseloads by emphasizing exits requires understanding the dynamic movement 
of social welfare populations. Programs not heeding dynamics can unintentionally increase caseload size, 
making officials look bad and government programs ineffective. And what is true of more formal 
caseloads like TANF and homeless shelters is true for more conceptual caseloads such as households in 
poverty and those who are unemployed. 
 This paper uses homeless shelter caseloads to examine logical and empirical issues in addressing 
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caseload management, particularly caseload reduction.2 It focuses on caseload dynamics as the crucial 
conceptual framework for effective policymaking and utilizes this framework to examine the logic and 
empirics of prevention and discharge policies. The paper makes two empirical points. First, despite the 
alluring chords of its logic, prevention may be a siren song. For example, efforts to prevent homelessness 
run aground because we lack sufficient knowledge about who becomes homeless and what services work. 
Further, the nature of homelessness—and of other social welfare problems—may disable prevention's 
logic, suggesting it may never be a major tool for reducing homeless, and perhaps other social welfare, 
populations. Second, resource allocation to reduce caseload size should be in tune with caseload 
dynamics. Allocating permanent housing subsidies to homeless shelter users is a useful example. 
Ignoring shelter dynamics when making these allocations could make shelters a less costly path to 
relatively scarce subsidies. One result could be—has been—an increase in shelter caseloads.  
 Although the analysis focuses on homeless caseloads, these issues are not peculiar to it. They 
confront public officials addressing welfare and foster care (Bane & Ellwood 1983; Ellwood 1986; 
Schuerman et al 1993; Wulczyn et al 1990b) and are not unique to social welfare problems (Clark & 
Summers 1979). Furthermore, our analysis uses evidence from foster care indicating a story similar to 
homelessness. In the early nineties (the time of the empirical study in this paper), the number of people in 
foster care soared, just as with homeless shelters, tearing up families and burdening government budgets 
(Wulczyn et al 1990b; Wulczyn 2003); too, foster care and homelessness may share some causes (Berlin 
& McAllister 1994); and policy responses have been similar. The early nineties foster care crisis 
spawned "family preservation" programs that tried to prevent placements by keeping children and parents 
together with brief, intensive doses of counseling and social services, and officials tried to reduce the 
foster care population by hastening exits. Further, as we later show, the importance of caseload dynamics 
in discharge policy is similar to what the analysis finds in homelessness.  
 The paper is organized by explaining in section two the logic of how caseload size changes. Section 
three focuses on one response that seems to follow from that logic—prevention—and explains why 
prevention is less likely to reduce caseload than we initially might think. Section four addresses the other 
major policy response—discharge by allocating resources to those in the caseload—and explains why 
caseload dynamics is crucial for allocating effectively. The paper concludes by explaining some limits 
and opportunities in using caseload dynamics for policymaking.  
2. Caseload dynamics: homeless shelters 
 Every day, hundreds of people are entering and leaving shelters. Of the entrants, most are coming in 
for the first time; others have hit bottom before. Of those leaving, some have stayed just one night, or 
maybe a week; many have been sheltered for months. The rest may never leave. In this way, homeless 
people are no different from those entering and leaving either other assistance programs, such as welfare 
and foster care, or fiscally problematic statuses such as poverty or unemployment. And so the same 
principles of dynamics are instructive for policy making and implementation in all these areas. 
 These principles can be summarized in the determinants of population size: the number of people 
entering a condition and the rate at which people already in that condition leave. The following equation 
                     
2 Policymakers and public administrators often emphasize reducing caseloads, hence we take this goal as a given to 
explain the utility of understanding dynamics in policymaking. As the conclusion explains, however, understanding 
caseload dynamics has a policy utility beyond this particular objective, and, indeed, is useful for achieving the 
unorthodox, but perhaps politically important, goal of effectively increasing programmatic or conceptual caseload size. 
Also, we use shelters for the analysis, but this should not be taken to mean shelters define homelessness. A 
“conceptual caseload” of homelessness could include those on the streets, in abandoned buildings, and doubled- and 
tripled-up with friends or relatives. We simply do not have good enough measures of these populations and their 
caseload dynamics to analyze. It would be an important step in resolving many social welfare problems to develop 
these measures. 
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shows how this is so, assuming both the number and rate are constant:  
  S = E * (1 - R) * (1 - (1 - R)n)/R 
     where  
   S =  size of caseload at a point-in-time 
   E  = number of entrants per time period (e.g., per month) 
   R = exit rate of entrants per time period 
   n = number of time periods caseload has existed 
 Sometimes populations grow or diminish because just E or R changes, sometimes because both do; 
and the comparable impact of each may not be the same. Other times, population size remains unchanged 
because one factor corrects in response to changes in the other, as when the exit rate increases to match 
the increase in entrants (see, for example, Wulczyn et al 1990a, 6). In homelessness, the first determinant 
can be understood as the number of people entering shelters, say, each month, and the second as the 
probability of shelter users leaving each month. In making homeless policy, as in foster care, welfare and 
other areas, knowing which determinant(s) is causing the population to grow (or decline) is obviously 
crucial. And an unchanging population can mask an underlying dynamic policymakers may not want to 
maintain. Knowing what causes each determinant and what policies will correctly affect each is critical 
to making sure caseloads do not grow. Further, the values both statistics take are related to the difference 
between the discounted value of benefits, such as subsidized permanent housing, and their discounted 
cost, the circumstances of shelter living and the qualifying shelter length-of-stay.3 The next section builds 
on these insights by considering prevention policy, commonly thought to be a useful strategy for reducing 
the number of shelter (caseload) entrants.  
3. Prevention: logic and evidence 
 The logic underlying prevention initiatives is mischievously simple: identify people before they have 
a specific problem and provide what they need to avoid the problem. Prevention, then, requires knowing 
two things: who has a strong likelihood of having the problem and what services work to help people 
avoid it. In homelessness, we know little about the first and virtually nothing about the second. As a 
consequence, the argument that prevention can be a major tool in combating homelessness, in helping 
people avoid homeless shelters, is vastly overstated (e.g., Schwartz et al 1991, 8; Lindblom 1991; 1996).4 
  
 Identification. Becoming homeless is rare. Evidence suggests that 3 percent of people living in the 
United States have been street or shelter homeless over a five year period (Link et al 1994), and perhaps 
somewhat less than one million adults without children are homeless at any one time (Burt et al 2001).5 
Even if all homeless people (including children) come from households in poverty—a likely source of 
homeless adults—about one in sixteen poor people would become homeless (Burt et al 2001). And not 
all homeless people come from poverty.  
 Two studies of would-be homeless families in New York City show, practically speaking, about 30 to 
40 percent of families entering a homeless shelter may be able to be identified in advance.6 One collected 
                     
3 Here we are concerned only with the housing subsidy benefit, but we state the proposition generally since this may be 
only one such benefit to be gained from entering a shelter. 
4 The effectiveness of prevention depends, in part, on how we define homelessness. Consider a definition that includes 
people on the streets and in shelters, and another which also incorporates those doubled-up. Because doubling-up, rather 
than living on the street or in shelters, is a more common response to losing one's home, a greater percentage of a larger 
pool of would-be homeless people could be prevented from becoming homeless under the second definition. 
5 Here and below, Burt et al (2001) data are for 1996.  
6 To our knowledge (and that of Shinn & Baumohl 1998), these are the only homeless entrant identification studies 
that have been conducted. 
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survey data from families requesting (not necessarily entering) shelter (Knickman & Weitzman 1989).7 
The OLS prediction model included variables such as family housing history (including prior shelter 
use), the parents' substance abuse history, current pregnancy or child under one, degree of personal 
disruptions in the parents' lives, such as child abuse and foster care, and parents' age and ethnicity. The 
study found targeting three percent of Aid to Families with Dependent Children population (AFDC) 
would find 30 percent of families requesting shelter.8 (For the most part, only AFDC families entered 
shelters at that time.) At the time of the study, over the course of a year, this would mean providing 
homeless prevention services to about 9,000 families to reach 3,000 who would go into a shelter 
(assuming all requesters entered).9 Arguably, this is promising. But it still leaves 70 percent of entering 
families unidentified, and 60 percent of families receive prevention services they do not need to avoid 
entering a shelter. 
 Moreover, the model is less useful than it initially appears. The variable "current pregnancy", for 
example, had the largest coefficient, and the authors include it among the "at-risk" factors on which the 
public assistance population could be sorted for vulnerability to homelessness. But its statistical 
importance is almost certainly more an artifact of New York City policy than of social and economic 
conditions. At the time of the study, city policy gave shelter priority to pregnant women, raising the 
likelihood they would be more likely to enter a shelter, other things being equal. Absent this policy, the 
model would have predicted much less well. When the policy was changed, the proportion of entering 
families with a pregnant mother decreased.10 More important, the data intensity of the model makes it 
impractical. The model requires frequent, extensive surveys of all public assistance families that local 
agencies may find too costly or time consuming to carry out. 
 
                     
7 The survey was conducted on families formally requesting shelter at social welfare offices, not on families actually 
entering a shelter. Not all requesting families decide to enter. At the time of the survey, about 20 percent of requesters 
did not enter a shelter on the day they requested it, though they may have entered at a later date. Whether requesters 
differ from those who enter is unknown. The study assumes, i.e., the estimates reported here assume, there is no 
difference. 
8 Knickman and Weitzman also developed a model that identified three percent of the AFDC population to find 42 
percent of families requesting shelter. The sensitivity of the survey questions on which the study is based, however, 
combined with the problems of the model reported in the text, makes this model even more impractical. 
9  Given the transformations involved in changing AFDC into TANF, adapting these estimates to current populations 
is not straightforward. The large reduction in the New York City welfare (AFDC/TANF) caseloads suggest that these 
rates would improve, all other things remaining unchanged.   
10 Pregnancy could also cause a shelter request if the mother is living with a boyfriend who refuses to support her and the 
child; or if the mother is living with a relative or friend, pregnancy could cause such household problems that she is 
asked to leave. If such scenarios figured largely in pregnant women requesting shelter, the regression coefficient would 
be a result of social and economic conditions and not New York City policy. 
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A more recent analysis using the same data found a best model that identified 66 percent of actual shelter 
requesters and misidentified 10 percent of the population of shelter requesters (Shinn et al 1998). This 
suffers from some of the same problems as the prior analysis, in particular, the importance of pregnancy 
in the model. And from a policy perspective, Shinn and Baumohl (1998) point out that, employing this 
best model and using New York City population sizes at the time of the study, prevention services would 
have to be provided to 27,000 families who would not request shelter to reach the 6,000 that would. 
Eighty percent of prevention services would go to families not in danger of entering a shelter (though 
such services might be otherwise useful). 
 Using more readily available data from New York City's social service records, a second study found 
that families who had moved at least twice before entering a shelter and who had their welfare eligibility 
ended (and reinstated) at least twice were more likely than other AFDC families to enter a shelter. These 
criteria fit 12 percent of New York's AFDC population, among whom were 42 percent of the families 
entering shelters (Towber & Flemming 1989, 3). Such identification would be useful in reducing the 
number of families entering shelters, assuming effective prevention services. Still, the sensitivity rate 
would be about 60 percent and the specificity rate would be over 85 percent. 
 Many homeless—and other social service—prevention programs try to solve the identification 
problem by using "late intervention" models. The model calls for helping a family or person when the 
loss of their home is absolutely imminent or has recently occurred, usually due to landlord eviction. 
Compared to servicing, say, all extremely poor people, this obviously increases the chances of finding 
those likely to enter a shelter, but probably not by much. Instead of going to a shelter, for example, 
evicted people may double-up or move to cheaper or other housing. A New York City study reported 75 
percent of the households in its sample who lost housing did not enter a shelter but stayed with friends 
and relatives until they found their own permanent housing (Towber & Flemming 1989, 6). And perhaps 
only 25 to 30 percent of homelessness is due directly or indirectly to landlord eviction (New York State 
Department of Social Services 1990, 14). 
 A final problem is these studies only try to distinguish potentially homeless families. But because 
homeless families are less mobile than homeless adults and because they tend to come from the 
population of families already known to local welfare agencies, identifying and finding would-be 
homeless families is much easier than identifying and finding similarly fated single adults. And adults 
without children make up about 85% of those who become homeless (Burt et al 2001, 57). Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of would-be homeless households will be much harder to distinguish and locate 
than these family studies suggest. 
 These problems are not unique to homeless prevention. In foster care prevention, Illinois' Family 
First program used criteria that identified children at "imminent risk of placement", criteria that identified 
families far along in their deterioration (comparable to "late intervention" in homelessness). Yet only 
seven percent of these children would be expected to be placed into foster care during the first month of 
the program; sixteen percent by the sixth month (Schuerman et al 1993, 102-103).   
 Services. Even assuming we could identify those likely to become homeless, what can be done to 
avoid that outcome? Most prevention programs deal with specific housing problems, particularly the 
threat of eviction, and typically offer one-time rent, utility or mortgage payments, financial counseling or 
landlord-tenant mediation. Evidence that these and other prevention services work, however, is weak or 
non-existent.11  Programs or studies do not report comparative data specifying what proportion of those 
helped would have stayed housed absent the program (see, for example, Schwartz et al 1991; Feins et al 
1994). Critically, most programs do not follow-up to see whether or not assisted clients remain housed. In 
                     
11  Shinn and Baumohl (1998) reach a similar conclusion and provide a more comprehensive explication of these 
programs and the problems with their effectiveness claims than is possible here. 
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reviewing 42 programs, the United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) found only eight that 
followed-up, and the agency found the follow-ups were not done well enough to support programmatic 
claims of success (GAO 1990). Further, these claims usually do not distinguish between being evicted 
and becoming homeless by entering a shelter.  One study making this distinction, a study of late-
intervention prevention programs across New York State, projected that 12 to 16 percent of those 
assisted would have entered a shelter (New York State Department of Social Services 1990, 19-21). But 
the estimated proportion of evictions that would have been averted absent prevention programs is not 
based on experimental data. Rather, service providers supplied the data, and since programs were not 
fully operational, the numbers are projections of what service providers expected would happen. 
Typically, service providers are likely to overestimate their abilities, do not track their efforts very well, 
and have incentives to present an optimistic picture. And we do not know from the study whether assisted 
families stayed housed.12  
 Last, most prevention services address problems of people who do not make up the bulk of those 
homeless at any one time—people homeless for over a year and suffering severe problems. These are 
mostly destitute men who are mentally ill or physically disabled or use illegal drugs (or some 
combination; Burt 1992, 17-30). But services typically address the short-term housing problems of 
families with incomes far above those of the average homeless person or family (Schwartz et al 1991, 7). 
And there are logical problems as well. The section on caseload dynamics shows prevention programs’ 
impact on population size decreases to the extent they service those who would enter shelters for shorter 
rather than longer periods of time. This is because longer-term users are most responsible for caseload 
size at any one time.13  
 Evidence from foster care also shows how difficult it is to provide effective preventive services. 
Illinois' Family First programs, for example, worked intensively with targeted families for several 
months, providing an array of material and social psychological help. Using a two group, random 
assignment design, one study concluded services did too little in the face of deeper economic and social 
ills, such as poor job prospects, and did it too late in the process of family disintegration to reduce the 
number of foster care placements (Schuerman et al 1993, 169).  
 This conclusion points to a troubling issue for social welfare prevention. Waiting until a problem is 
imminent improves targeting and lowers costs, but it may also mean waiting until the problem becomes 
too difficult for prevention services to resolve. The earlier the intervention, however, the more service 
provision becomes costly, intrusive, and politically and practically difficult. If public officials are to use 
prevention to reduce caseloads, the intersection of these continua that is optimal for reducing entrants has 
to be better calibrated. And, as we will now suggest, even then we cannot now say such a point will yield 
a large reduction in entrants. 
 Evaluating prevention effects. One simple way to estimate a “preventive effect” (P) is to multiply 
the proportion of would-be homeless single adults and families identified in advance (I) by the proportion 
avoiding shelters due to prevention program services (E), i.e., P = I * E. Available data allow only rough, 
but arguably not unrealistic, estimates of these parameters.14 We assume programs can identify 40 
                     
12  Even if we expand the concept of prevention programs to include structural programs such as providing 
permanent housing which may not have the problems suggested here, to the extent that such programs rely on a static 
supply of permanent housing, they do have the problem of merely reallocating homelessness among the population 
of very poor people (Shinn & Baumohl 1998). 
13 We do not know enough about how people become homeless to say conclusively that those with short-term problems, 
e.g., problems responsive to a one-time infusion of money or legal services, would not become long-term homeless if 
that problem were not resolved. Redburn and Buss (1986) suggest that short-term adult shelter users may have been 
evicted or suffered a singular disaster or personal crisis, whereas long-term users may have serious mental or physical 
disabilities or other dysfunctions. See also Kuhn and Culhane (1998). 
14  The identification estimate for families is the highest given by the New York City models reported in the text. The 
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percent of shelter-entering homeless families and 30 percent of entering homeless single adults. We 
further assume services can keep 45 percent of families or assisted persons in their current housing, move 
them into other permanent housing, such as a residential facility for the mentally ill, or get them other 
services that work to prevent entering a shelter. Using Burt et al's (2001) estimate that 85 percent of 
homeless households are single adults and that 15 percent are families, we can thus estimate P = .14 = 
((.15*.4)+(.85*.3))*.45.15 Arguably helpful, 14 percent is not the major impact on homelessness 
prevention's proponents aver.16   
 Another way to estimate a preventive effect uses the logic and evidence of random assignment 
studies. Social welfare programs are often thought to "work" even when such studies show statistically 
significant differences of 5 to 10 percent between experimental and control groups. Should this 
perspective affect the previous conclusion concerning prevention’s small caseload effects? 
 To begin, this experimental difference is not the same measure as the preventive effect described 
above. Realistically, the preventive effective for homelessness—and probably for other caseloads—will 
be less than the experimental difference. Most of the reason for this is that those in the experimental 
group whose shelter or caseload entrance could be affected by preventive services do not constitute all 
would-be entrants. They are some subset identified by the program's targeting criteria. The lower the 
proportion of all would-be entrants who are identified, the less likely is the preventive effective to be 
equal to or greater than the experimental difference. Optimistically, this number could be as high as 40 
percent and would still be too low to raise the preventive effect above the experimental difference.17  
 To see why, let's assume a 10 percent difference between experimental and control groups in a 
hypothetical, random assignment, homeless prevention study. In the context of random assignment, social 
welfare experiments, this is a relatively strong difference and so we may take it as an upper bound for 
experimental/control differences. We designate this effect as X1. However, arguments have been made that 
this underestimates an experiment's impact. If only half the control group needed services to avoid entering 
a caseload, the effect of the experiment on those who could be affected would be 20 percent (0.1/0.5). Let's 
designate this effect as X2 and take the 20 percent as an upper bound for this measure. Now, this latter 
                                                                  
estimate for single adults is three-fourths the family estimate: the social amorphousness of this population combined with 
its mobility suggest that at-risk adults are harder to identify and find. The estimate for the proportion effectively assisted 
arbitrarily assumes that program services addressing all reasons for homelessness would be half the estimated 
effectiveness of services that address landlord eviction (New York State Department of Social Services 1990, 19). 
Because eviction usually has to do with rent or other landlord/tenant disputes, it can be resolved with a grant or with 
legal representation, both relatively quickly and easily provided. For people with mental or addiction disabilities or 
social problems, prevention services are much more difficult to provide and take a longer time to administer, suggesting 
they will not be as effective as eviction prevention.  
   Identifying and finding those at-risk could be improved by using institutions would-be shelter users pass through, e.g., 
jails and mental health and other hospitals. In theory, these places could identify and hold on to would-be homeless 
single adults and prevent their becoming homeless by, for example, placing them in a residential mental health facility or 
getting them to some kind of prevention service. At present, these places do not do these things and it may be unrealistic 
to expect they will. For instance, mental hospitals, among all these institutions, would seem most likely to take some 
responsibility for the whereabouts of their discharges. Yet some do not have out-placement services and others do not 
follow through on the ones they do have. If mental hospitals cannot be convinced to do these things, what chance have 
we of getting other institutions, such as jails, to do so? 
15  Burt et al's (2001) estimates are for those homeless on any day (point prevalence). Although Link et al (1994) do 
not break out their five-year and lifetime prevalence rates by type of homeless household, an implication of their 
findings is that homeless adults households dominate for these periods as well. 
16  Also note that this ignores the inefficiency of a high specificity rate: identified families getting services who 
would not have entered shelters. 
17 This analysis assumes experimental effects calculations (X1) based on everyone in the control and experimental 
groups and not some subset, such as program participants. Thus, it somewhat underestimates X1. 
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measure is equivalent to E in the equation estimating the preventive effect (P = E * I). That is,  
   E = X1 / (1 - C) 
and so 
   P = I * (X1 / (1 - C)) 
 where 
   E  = effectiveness of prevention programs  
   X1 = the experimental effect expressed as a difference in proportions between control and 
experimental groups 
   C  = the proportion in the control group not needing a program's services to avoid entering a 
caseload  
   P  =  proportion of would-be sheltered entrants deterred from entering  ("preventive effect") 
 
     These equations tells us several things about the relationship between the preventive effect and the two 
measures of experimental effects: 
(a) since E = X2, the preventive effect P will never be greater than X2, the larger experimental effect 
measure; 
(b) however, except when all would-be entrants are identified (I = 1)—a singular condition—the 
preventive effect will be less than X2;  
(c) whether P is greater or less than X1 depends mostly on whether the proportion of all entrants who 
are identified (I) is high or low, respectively. The proportion of the population needing services to 
avoid entering a caseload (1 - C) is much less important. Obviously, however, the greater this is, the 
more likely is P to be less than X1. The preventive effect will equal the difference between the 
experimental and control groups (X1) under the extremely unlikely condition that I = 1 and C = 0. 
      Thus, to restate our point, current knowledge about homelessness suggests I is unlikely to be greater 
than 0.4. And it is rare in social welfare experiments for C to be less than 0.5. That is, 50 percent of the 
experimental group can avoid some specified outcome without the tested program's services, and no more 
than 40 percent of all would-be shelter entrants can be identified by current targeting. These optimistic 
parameters show a preventive effect just under X1 = 0.1. For a more likely set of parameters, i.e., I < 0.4 
and C > 0.5, the preventive result will be much less than 10 percent. This suggests our rough estimate of 
a preventive effect of 14 percent may be optimistic, and, more generally, if prevention's goal is to reduce 
caseloads by deterring a large proportion of would-be entrants, its effects now seem too slight to 
achieve this aim.18  
 More important, what does it mean in this context for a prevention program to "work"? One way to 
answer this question is to use a broad cost-benefit perspective that incorporates societal, program 
participant, and non-participant perspectives (Kemper et al 1983). The first evaluates all benefits and 
costs to society as a whole, ignoring the transfer of benefits and costs among groups within the society. 
The second weighs the intended and perhaps unintended benefits and costs to participants. And the third 
values the impact on government budgets, or more completely, the effectiveness of the government's 
investment in the program. Proponents of homeless prevention programs argue that they produce positive 
cost-benefit outcomes from one or more of these perspectives. Few, however, have tried to formally 
make estimates from one of these perspectives. More important, cost-benefit analysis is not directly 
relevant to our argument. A large cost-benefit ratio does not necessarily mean prevention works to reduce 
would-be entrants.  
                     
18 This assumes prevention deters randomly with regard to caseload length-of-stay. If prevention diverts longer-term or 
repeat users, its impact on caseload size might be great even if it prevents a small proportion of entrants. But if 
prevention deters shorter-term users, it's impact will be less than under the random assumption. Because no evidence 
exists on this point, we make the random assumption. The logic of this argument is explained in the next section. 
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 Taking the governmental cost-benefit perspective, for example, many suggest prevention is more cost 
effective than shelters for government budgets and so should be a primary tool in dealing with 
homelessness. In the only cost-benefit study we know, the New York State Department of Social Services 
(1990, 23) estimated a budgetary savings of $4 for every $1 spent in homeless family prevention 
programs. But, as noted earlier, because this study relied on estimates and projections from service 
providers and because it lacked experimental and follow-up data, the reported benefit-cost ratio is 
probably greater than the true ratio.19 Studies of homeless prevention programs require better data than 
currently exist to make useful cost-benefit estimates. The obvious fiscal appeal of prevention's logic does 
not mean savings will necessarily be realized. This claim must remain open.  
 Moreover, fiscal cost-benefit analyses show whether prevention programs save the government 
money, not that they can reduce the number of sheltered people. If shelters are very expensive and 
preventing homelessness is very cheap, the benefit can be much greater than the cost without our 
necessarily witnessing a large drop in the proportion of shelter entrants. Welfare to work programs, for 
example, can make fiscal sense because they cost very little to run and reduce slightly the cost of the 
average welfare grant. But they can have very little or no impact on welfare caseloads (Friedlander et al 
1993, 42-56). 
 But even if cost-benefit calculations showed prevention programs cost the government more than 
shelters, prevention programs might deserve support. The social benefits could outweigh the fiscal (and 
social) cost. Shelters may be worse than a person's current living situation, and the path to shelters can be 
long and painful, winding through physical disabilities, the homes of relatives and friends and through 
harsh circumstances that people, some of them children, should not have to endure. Note, however, these 
and other social benefits can be obtained without much of an impact on the number of shelter entrants. 
 Last, some argue prevention programs should be funded because they help people in need, even if 
they do little to reduce homelessness. (See, for example, NYC Family Homelessness Special Master 
Panel 2003, 37.) And we would agree—prevention programs probably do help impoverished families and 
individuals, few of whom would ever enter a shelter. Similarly, foster care prevention programs provide 
"considerable benefit" to very troubled families even as they have no effect on foster care placement 
(Schuerman et al 1993, 163-168). This suggests prevention programs be evaluated and supported on their 
ability to provide needed help to families who would otherwise not be assisted. 
                     
19 Making its own count, the Human Services Administration of New York City, for example, had a smaller estimate of 
the number of program beneficiaries in New York City and of its impact on shelter use (McAllister 1994). 
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4. Allocating Resources 
 Policy choice. A straightforward and oft suggested homeless policy is to provide subsidized 
permanent housing to all those already homeless. How would this be done? To start, even if the 
definition of homelessness is limited to those living on streets or in shelters, there have historically been 
far more homeless than newly available subsidized or nonprofit housing. During the course of a recent 
year, perhaps as few as 870,000 and as many as 2.1 million adult and family households are street or 
shelter homeless (Burt et al 2001). And these estimates do not include the hundreds of thousands of 
displaced single adult or family households who are homeless or live doubled-up (Nelson and Khadduri 
n.d., 9).20 However, net new rental commitments (Section 8 certificates, vouchers, loan management set 
aside and other programs) have averaged less than 100,000 units in recent years (Dolbeare & Crowley 
2002), and useable annual turnover in these and public housing subsidies may add about 500,000 units 
(Nelson 1994).21 Clearly the amount of newly available subsidized housing is not enough to house all 
homeless households, even if the housing needs of other populations of poor people were completely 
ignored. And, of course, these subsidies could not just be targeted to homeless people. They also are 
expected to be used by other populations, including five million with "worst case" housing needs (Bratt 
2002).22  
 Moreover, these subsidies usually do not to go to poor single men and women, the kind of household 
making up 85 percent of homeless households. Local governments and nonprofits allocating subsidized 
housing to homeless people have generally limited permanent housing subsidies to shelter dwellers.23 
Given the large number of households generally eligible for federal housing subsidies, however, even this 
strategy cannot meet demand. Eligible households might be especially interested in the subsidized 
                     
20 Because income is underreported on the American Housing Survey (AHS) that is used to derive the estimate of "worst 
case" families, both the number of very low income renters and the proportion of renters with severe rent burdens may 
be high. In the past, HUD has estimated that the income of very low income renter households was underreported by at 
least 15 percent (HUD 1991, 46). This underestimate is somewhat offset by AHS not counting homeless families and 
single adults or households that are about to be displaced. In addition, are millions of other households with "priority 
problems"—rent burdens greater than 50 percent or severely inadequate housing—who do not qualify as "worst cases" 
because they were not unassisted renter households with incomes less than 50 percent of the local area median (Nelson 
& Khadduri n.d., 9). 
21 Nelson analysis based on 1991 and 1983 American Housing Survey. At that time, although one million holders of 
Federal subsidies, including public housing, moved into their current housing in the year prior to the survey, perhaps half 
already held subsidies (Nelson (1994). These estimates probably do not include Farmers Home Administration 
subsidies. Since homelessness is much more an urban than a rural problem, turnover in rural subsidies would be little 
help.)  
     The homeless population estimate is based on 1996 survey data and evidence suggests it has probably increased since 
then (Bratt 2002). Because the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 includes nonelderly single adults among 
households eligible for Section 8 housing subsidies, we use the term "household" to mean single persons as well as 
families. Since state governments generally do not provide housing assistance to very poor households, we report only 
Federal programs (Shapiro et al. 1991, 49. One exception is New York State's New York/New York program for people 
who are homeless and mentally ill. See Culhane et al 2002). 
22 Worst-case estimate is for 1999. Worst case means households that rent their dwelling; do not received federal 
housing assistance; have incomes below 50 percent of area median family income; pay more than 50 percent of their 
reported gross income on rent and utilities or live in physically substandard or overcrowded housing (HUD 1996, 1). 
The estimate excludes homeless households. The number of households is a point-in-time estimate. Most households 
qualify as "worst case" because of excessive rent burdens, which HUD may be overestimating. Officially, however, this 
remains the pool competing with homeless households. 
23 Although this is effectively the situation, governments and nonprofits did not create shelters in order to allocate 
housing. Rather, as their shelter populations burgeoned, both decided to provide permanent housing as a way to control 
shelter size. But see the discussion in the conclusion regarding the importance of caseloads for turning personal 
problems into public issues. 
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housing they could gain by a shelter stay. In the face of these conditions, trying to “end homelessness” by 
providing housing subsidies to all who are sheltered creates an incentive to enter shelters to obtain the 
subsidies for which people qualify but are now without. The rest of this section explains why this is so 
and then report supportive evidence. 
 How much providing housing subsidies to shelter dwellers causes qualified people to try entering 
shelters is governed by the difference between the discounted value of those subsidies and the discounted 
cost of obtaining them. This difference will depend on the "nominal" value of the subsidized housing to a 
person, the circumstances of shelter, and the amount of time someone has to stay sheltered before 
obtaining the housing.24 The nominal value of the subsidized housing is how well that housing compares 
with a person's current housing situation—its physical quality, rent burden, locale, social circumstances 
and the person's tastes. The larger the difference, the greater the value. Shelter conditions are also 
evaluated relative to a person's current housing situation and include the characteristics and physical 
quality of the shelters; required participation in social service programs; and regulations governing 
overnight guests, alcohol consumption, drug use and other aspects of daily life. By varying these 
conditions as well as the amount of time a person has to spend in a shelter before obtaining permanent 
housing, governments and nonprofits determine the cost of obtaining a housing subsidy.  
 Obviously, then, the cost-benefit difference increases as the time to obtain benefits shortens or 
shelter conditions "improve". As the wait for a subsidy approaches one shelter day or as shelter living 
becomes more like a person's current housing, the more will people seek to enter a shelter. Allocating 
permanent housing to more recent shelter entrants—by assigning housing randomly or by trying to house 
everyone who is sheltered or judged ready for permanent housing—would make more amenable the cost 
of a shelter stay for many of the millions of unsubsidized households who are not homeless yet qualify 
for subsidies. This would greatly expand shelter demand.25
 Examples of this effect occurred in three areas where shelter agencies specified or would-be shelter 
entrants perceived shelter occupants would gain subsidies after a short or virtually no shelter stay. In the 
late 1980s, St. Louis County, Missouri informed families waiting for Section 8 vouchers the Department 
of Housing and Urban Affairs (HUD) had established shelter occupancy as a priority criterion for 
vouchers. Families thought a shelter stay of any length would qualify them, causing the demand for 
shelter to become so great that the City of St. Louis began to require entering families to document they 
were city, and not suburban, residents.26 To further slow the flow, the city turned away those who stated 
as they were being assessed that they sought shelter to meet the HUD criterion (Daily 1993). 
 In Massachusetts, emergency preference or set-aside rental subsidies were not available for most 
families at-risk of homelessness. As a result, when the state established a special rental assistance 
program for sheltered families, it "had the unintended consequence of encouraging some desperate 
families to become homeless . . . to access scarce housing subsidies" (Stegman 1991, 258).  
 
                     
24 Exactly how potential shelter entrants would discount future subsidies and more imminent costs is unknown, but 
understanding how they do so is not critical to the point being made. 
25 The logic is the same for varying shelter conditions. Shelter time can be considered a shelter condition. 
26 Some families, for example, entered shelters and immediately requested a letter attesting to their shelter stay; they left 
just as soon when told the shelter would not issue the letter. Since St. Louis County did not have any shelters, suburban 
residents would try to enter city shelters. The city eschewed informing its residents of HUD's policy because it feared the 
shelter influx that the county's action caused. 
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And in the spring of 1990, New York City began providing subsidized housing to families who had been 
sheltered three months; less in some cases. As a result, from April through October, when the policy was 
changed, the monthly number of families entering shelters increased an average of 17.2 percent over the 
same months in the previous year.27
 These examples suggest that policies providing subsidies to recent shelter entrants will cause shelter 
demand to burgeon. Demand expands not because the causes of homelessness have worsened but because 
households that qualify for permanent housing see shelters as a more effective way to gain subsidies. 
Providing subsidized housing to sheltered people cannot be a general solution to emptying shelters. 
Given millions of qualified households without subsidies, it would be impossible to provide permanent 
housing to all who are sheltered without inducing households to enter shelters.  
 The next section supports this argument by analyzing a particular policy moment in New York City 
when dynamics was not heeded. It also demonstrates subsidies should go to those sheltered longest. 
Allocating subsidies in this way lessens, perhaps eliminates, demand caused by the promise of subsidies, 
ends living in shelters for those who most need permanent housing but are unlikely to find it themselves, 
discourages people from staying sheltered in order to qualify for subsidies, and uses housing subsidies 
more effectively in managing shelter size.  
 Dynamics in action. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, New York City's family shelter system 
provided temporary housing for any family requesting it and subsidized permanent housing to some 
sheltered families.28 Using data from families entering in June 1988 and February 1989, table one reports 
rates at which families would leave the New York City shelters on their own if the city did not provide 
permanent housing.29 To explain: reading across the second row, the chance of a family sheltered for 
thirty days leaving over the next thirty days would be 0.184; this means 12.8 percent of entering families 
or 2.0 percent of all families using shelters at any moment would leave—complete a shelter "spell"—
between the 31st and 60th day of their stay.30  
 The completed spell distributions of the table show two things relevant to allocating permanent 
housing. One, within their first ninety days, half the entering families would leave on their own (30.5% + 
12.8% + 7.1%), and, two, over 80 percent of those sheltered at any moment would, absent a housing 
program, be in the midst of spells greater than one year. Then, to allocate housing so as to have the 
largest impact on shelter size and to allocate it to families arguably most in need (i.e., most likely to stay 
sheltered), those who would stay sheltered longest should be identified and given subsidies. At present, 
the only practical way to identify such families is to wait until they have stayed a specified period of 
time.31 Because most would leave anyway, recent entrants should not be given housing. That is, 
                     
27 Authors' calculations based on data from the Human Resources Administration, City of New York. 
28 At the time of this case, New York City had an "open" shelter system, where any family requesting temporary 
housing was given shelter and allowed to stay as long as it wanted. In this case, the demand generated by people's 
weighing of benefits and costs translates directly into the number of entrants and rates of exit. The logic applies as 
well to "closed" shelters, where the shelter operator decides whether a family or person is homeless and how long each 
can stay. In this case, the relationship between demand and the number of entrants exists but is indirect. 
29 To remove the effects of policies giving apartments to shelter users, we added families who went to city-provided 
housing over the course of the month back into the shelter length-of-stay distributions of shelter users at the end of the 
month. This was based, of course, on how long those leaving had stayed in the shelters. 
30 These findings are similar to but indicate a slower rate of exit than the probabilities estimated in Culhane et al 
(1999) using New York City administrative data for the period 1987 to 1995. One reason for the difference may be 
the different time periods; perhaps a more potent reason is that the probabilities presented here do not include 
families leaving to City-provided housing. 
31 It would be better if officials could assign exit probabilities to all shelter users employing all available information, not 
just length-of-stay, and provide subsidies to those with the lowest probabilities. But this is currently impractical, seems 
legally and ethically dubious, and may create unwanted incentives. Optimally, these exit probabilities would estimate 
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allocating permanent housing to long-term shelter users has a greater impact on the exit rate than 
allocating to short-term users and is less likely to attract entrants who would not otherwise seek to enter 
shelters. 
 To see why, consider the hypothetical shelter in table two, based on the New York City conditional 
probabilities. Assuming one hundred families enter a shelter at the start of each month, panel A shows 
what this shelter would look thirteen to fifteen months after opening. For each entering cohort of one 
hundred families, the table calculates the number remaining at the end of thirty day intervals, based on 
exit probabilities shown in table one. Families sheltered longer than 360 days are counted as one group 
and are assumed to remain indefinitely. (This differs from the probabilities in table one, where the 
average exit rate for those remaining sheltered more than 360 days is estimated to be 0.0039.) 
 Panel A shows if resources such as housing are to be allocated to maximally control shelter size, 
families sheltered longest should receive the housing because they have the greatest chance of remaining 
sheltered. That is, they contribute nothing to the system exit rate which helps determine shelter size. 
Panels B and C make clear that if 30 units of permanent housing could be allocated each month, the 
population could be kept at zero growth rate (size = 508) by giving that housing to families sheltered 
more than 360 days, (since the shelter grows each month by adding that number of families to the > 360 
days group). By extreme contrast, if the housing were randomly given to entering families, ten (30.5 
percent) would go to families who would have left anyway, on their own, by the end of the first month, 
leaving a January population of 517. And, as panel B shows, the population difference between panels A 
and B would grow each month. 
 Another way of saying all this is that allocating housing to longer-term users causes a greater overall 
exit rate (families leaving to their own and to city provided housing) than giving it to shorter-term users. 
Families who would leave on their own are less likely to leave via subsidized housing, making it more 
possible for families who would only leave through such housing to get it. Further, because the value of 
subsidies decreases as the length-of-stay criterion is raised, this policy would increase the exit rate by 
discouraging families from remaining sheltered in order to qualify for permanent housing. And, of 
course, the policy would also discourage families from entering shelters to gain access to housing 
subsidies.   
 Policymaking that first utilized this logic and then ignored it occurred in New York City in the late 
eighties and early nineties. Seeking to decrease its shelter population after years of endless growth, city 
government began to provide subsidized housing to families sheltered at least one more-or-less 
continuous year.32 This reduced the number of sheltered families from a peak of 5,305 in June 1988 to 
3,686 in March 1990. Most of the decline was due to an increase in the overall exit rate of the shelter 
system as thousands of families unlikely to ever leave were given permanent housing. During this time, 
the monthly average number of entrants declined by only 21 families (2.5 percent) over the monthly average 
                                                                  
permanently leaving shelters, not just ending a particular shelter stay. That is, the episodic leavings of repeat users would 
be ignored, and total shelter time would be used for making probability estimates. Whether allocating benefits in this 
way makes practical sense, however, depends on the number of repeat users, how long they stay, the comparative cost of 
providing services and the chance that service provision will induce entrants, among other things. (See Ellwood 1986). 
     Longer-term users could have characteristics that differentiate them at entrance from the rest of the population, or 
they could be undifferentiated at entrance and the conditions of being sheltered could cause people to stay sheltered. See 
Hoch and Slayton (1989) for some arguments as to how shelters encourage dependence. Focusing policy on people who 
have stayed sheltered a long time is undermined if shelters or being homeless causes people to stay sheltered a long time 
and if ways other than waiting can be found to identify would-be longer-term users. 
     Last, even if we rely only on length-of-stay, the logic of the argument is that subsidies should be given to those 
sheltered longest, not to those sheltered a certain length of time. Specifying a time threshold, however, is more easily 
implemented. 
32 This includes families who left the shelters but returned within thirty days. 
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for the previous year. These are too few families to account, at best, for more than one-quarter of the 
population decline. 
  But beginning in November 1989 and quickening in April 1990, the city changed its policy, cutting 
the length-of-stay criterion from twelve months to nine and then to six months. Further, the policy was 
applied in a way that lowered the officially required shelter time by as much as three months. And in 
order to close certain shelters, the city sometimes ignored the length-of-stay criterion entirely. Over the 
summer of 1990, families who had recently entered shelters were given subsidized permanent housing. 
 Table three reports the predictable effects of these policy changes.33 It shows monthly percent 
changes from the previous year in the number of entrants and in the percent change in the exit rate of 
families leaving on their own. When the city most aggressively moved out shorter-term users between 
April and October 1990, the average number of families entering each month increased 17.2 percent from 
the previous April through October. This was a sharp change from the previous two years when the 
average number of entrants over this time had first declined 4 percent and then increased 2.7 percent, and 
from the year after when it decreased 2.6 percent.  
 Between June and October of 1990, the average change in the monthly exit rates of families leaving 
on their own showed a 1.9 percent decline below rate changes for the same period the previous year. 
(The data do not allow estimates to April 1989). June to October 1991 showed a 0.7 percent average 
increase in rate changes compared to changes for the same period in 1990.34  
                     
33 Although the length-of-stay criterion was initially lowered to nine months in November 1989, this analysis focuses on 
the period between April and October 1990 when the shortest length-of-stay criterion was applied. This is consistent 
with the logic of the argument that the shorter the criterion, the more likely the effects. To show what was happening 
immediately before April 1990 and after October 1990, the bottom panel in table three reports every month of the time 
series between November 1989 and October 1991. Data are not available to calculate changes in the overall exit rate 
before June 1990. 
     Cragg and O’Flaherty (1999) contend that the effects described here were not caused by these policy changes. They 
argue a host of economic, shelter and other policy changes caused population growth and, moreover, that greater 
placements would have resulted in a lower shelter population. There are several important differences that account for 
the different findings. First, Cragg and O’Flaherty are interested in explaining the three year shelter population trend 
from 1990 to 1993; we are more interested in the rise immediately surrounding the policy change. Second, their measure 
of time to permanent housing (queue) is more blunt than our analysis and does not take shelter dynamics as fully take 
into account. Their measure, for example, incorporates long term shelter users who were not able to be placed, and does 
not measure our contention that the queue expectation dropped greatly at a specific point in time for a certain potential 
shelter-using population. Third, their method requires that queue not be endogenous, i.e., that individual would-be 
shelter user time-to-placement expectations not be generated by the increase in permanent housing placement rates by 
worried policymakers. Such endogeneity is exactly our contention, rendering the model problematic. Wackstein’s 
(1991) report of policymakers thinking and behavior at this time supports our contention. 
34 Although the analysis does not examine other possible explanations for these changes, the more obvious ones appear 
remote. No other major policy change nor external event occurred in the spring of 1990 or had occurred in the recent 
past. For the number of entrants, systematic longer-term behavior consistent with changes in entrants seems unlikely. For 
example, the monthly percentage change in the number of entrants over the twelve month periods were: 
   April 1988 - March 1989: -   5.2% 
   April 1989 - March 1990: +  4.6 
   April 1990 - March 1991:  +12.1 
   April 1991 - March 1992:   -   0.7 
In the three years prior to April 1990, the yearly average number of entrants varied less than three percent from the three 
year average of 826. Between April 1990 and March 1991, the average number of entrants was 935 and stayed at that 
level through March of 1992. The time series for all years shows seasonal increases in July and August. The exit rate 
time series does not go back far enough to comment on systematic long-term behavior as an explanation. 
     Two additional pieces of evidence support the proposed explanation. Using an informal study her office 
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 Table four compares the effects of these policies on shelter population size. It shows how much 
lower the monthly population would have been between April 1990 and March 1991 if (a) the number of 
entrants had stayed at the same monthly levels as April 1989 through March 1990, (b) the exit rate of 
families leaving on their own had remained the same as the average rate between June 1989 and March 
1990, and (c) both conditions had existed. By March 1991, the shelter population would have been 714 
(entrants effect) or 672 (exit rate effect) less than it actually was.  
 Importantly, the analysis also shows changing the exit rate has a much greater impact than changing 
the number of entrants. The 12.1 percent increase in the total number of entrants over this period led to a 
shelter population that was 19.1 percent greater than if this increase had not occurred. But the decrease of 
1.8 percent in the average exit rate made the shelter population 17.8 percent larger than if this slow down 
had not occurred. A small change in the exit rate goes a long way. The importance of improving exit rates 
to reduce population size was also found in simulations of foster care populations. Increasing the chance 
of a child being discharged by 10 percent cut the foster care census by 8.4 percent over the base scenario. 
By contrast, preventing 4.5 percent of placements decreased the number of children in foster care by less 
than 1 percent, compared with the base scenario (Wulczyn 1990a, 31; Wulczyn 2003).35  
 Clearly, in homelessness and in foster care, as in welfare, reducing population size means paying 
attention to how people come and go, but especially to those who do not leave. The analysis further 
suggests the limited utility of prevention to lower population size, due likely to the kinds of people being 
prevented. For example, using the New York City data, if prevention programs randomly deter entrance, 
half those deterred would have left shelters on their own within three months and, thus, not contributed 
much to population size.  
                                                                  
conducted, the head of the Mayor's Office for Homeless and Single Room Occupancy Housing for New York City 
testified that the parents of entering families reported that they had learned they could get subsidized apartments by 
entering a shelter (Wackstein 1991). And the experience of the New York City family and adult shelters has been 
that large, dramatic shifts in the rate at which the population grew or declined were always occasioned by policy 
changes, such as lowering the length-of-stay criteria, not by external events or long-term systemic forces. For 
example, the population in New York's single adult shelters fell an average of 7 percent in the six months following 
April, 1989, after rising by an average of 6 percent the previous five months. This change, like the one recorded in 
the analysis of family shelters, occurred too dramatically for longer-time factors, such as economic or housing 
changes. The most likely cause was a policy implemented in April that initiated assessment and assignment to shelter 
and so limited shelter users' ability to access shelters when and as they wished. (All comparisons are to the same 
month in the previous year. Data limits prevent comparisons before November 1988.) 
35 As Wulczyn (2003 and private communication) points out, it is not always the case that exit rate change will be 
more effective for reducing the population. In particular, when the ratio of the population at the beginning of a time 
period (e.g., a year) to the number of new entrants over a similarly measured time period (e.g., a year) is below 1.0 
and the exit rate of would-be entrants to a caseload is not “high”, preventing new entrants can be more effective. The 
work has not yet been done to specify more precisely what “high” means.   
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5. Conclusions 
 To explain the utility of caseload dynamics for policymaking around prevention and resource 
allocation, we have focused on a common goal of policymakers and public administrators: reducing 
caseload size. In practice, we could argue with such a singular focus and yet observe the policy utility of 
caseload dynamics. 
 First, caseloads are a narrow construction of a problem and are more about the fiscal and 
organizational needs of government and other organizations than about the lives of actual people. For 
example, we can consider individuals homeless even if they are not living in a shelter, but rather on the 
street or doubled- and tripled-up in the home of a friend or relative. Making policy for such conceptual 
caseloads, however, does not exclude our need to pay attention to caseload dynamics. If we can think of 
individuals in a certain status as a caseload, we can use dynamics to better utilize resources to reduce 
caseload size, that is, to reduce the problem more broadly conceived. Thinking of problems as caseloads 
points out the importance of measurement and its intimate relationship with theory, and how both result 
from political constructions of social reality. 
 Second, even if we only consider programmatic caseloads, such as shelter users, we might want to 
expand rather than contract them. This seems peculiar. Don’t social welfare caseloads indicate people 
suffering from some problems that they, and we, would rather they not have? Put another way, we might 
think of caseloads as gathering together people who suffer a common condition—being poor, having no 
home, having abusive parents, having no work and so forth. That is, caseloads make public the personal 
problems people face. In this sense, caseloads are ways to transform individual problems into public 
issues and, as such, represent particular constructions of those individual problems. We have argued, for 
example, family homelessness can be understood almost entirely as a result of the existence of family 
shelters (Berlin & McAllister 1994). We do not argue shelters cause their problems, but that these 
families may not be known to the government and thus addressed by public policy except for the 
existence of shelters and that these problems become understood as “homelessness” because of the 
criteria for entering a particular caseload, the shelters. Thus, in transforming personal, individual 
problems into public caseloads, we might want to expand government caseloads as a way to address these 
individuals' problems. Understanding dynamics can here be used to wisely expand caseloads so that size 
does not overwhelm resources able to be committed and, perhaps, to identify those individuals and families 
most needing assistance.  
 Third, dynamics helps illuminate policy goal-setting. It discloses, for example, that a strong conflict 
can exist between reducing the population of a shelter and giving immediate, significant, long-term help 
to shelter entrants. Choosing caseload reduction can effectively mean telling mothers who have children 
but no place to live that we are not very interested in their problem. This should be understood as a 
painful choice, and should lead us to be generally suspicious about caseload reduction for its own sake. 
In this way, policies in tune to dynamics may be relatively inexpensive stopgap measures that try to 
manage a situation rather than resolve a problem. They make clear what we are not willing to do to 
respond to the social and economic ills underlying these problems. 
 Fourth, the relationship between prevention and resource allocation may be used effectively to make 
policies. The analysis presented in this paper, for example, has ignored the issue of multiple entrants onto 
caseloads—families, for example, who leave shelters even within the first several months only to return 
many times, perhaps becoming long-term continuous users or long-term chronic users. Policies targeting 
such multiple entrants and providing them with aftercare services is one example of taking the logic of 
prevention to reduce the exit rate and, thereby, more generally respond to homelessness, (though our 
current ability to target or to provide effective services is unknown). 
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Fifth, although our analysis strongly questions the current utility of prevention, it does not argue useful 
prevention is impossible. Rather, the analysis observes that, in practice, prevention is much more 
complicated than we may like to think. We simply do not know enough about either who is likely to enter a 
shelter and what services work to for prevention to have a large effect on the numbers entering a caseload. 
(See also Shinn & Baumohl 1998.) Moreover, given scarce resources, if prevention is to affect caseload 
size, we really need to identify the population of would-be long-term shelter users and to provide services 
before their problems become so severe that typical preventive efforts would fail. These are obviously calls 
for more and different research, but there is simply no way around it if we want prevention to live up to its 
aphoristic claims.  
And last, because prevention cannot now work very well to reduce caseloads, justifications for such 
programs make unsupportable prevention claims. This is the sort of thing that gives social welfare initiatives 
a bad name. When prevention efforts fail to reduce caseloads, it becomes more difficult to generate support 
for other kinds of programs thought useful for addressing a problem. Better to base arguments for programs 
on their actual impacts. If  we cannot prevent caseload entry but can help people in other ways through 
programs we currently label “preventive”, we should still carry out those programs but measure their 
effectiveness and justify their existence by something other than caseload reduction. 
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 Table 1.  Exit rates and homeless spell distributions: 
New York City family shelters, 1988-89 
 Completed spell distributions  
Length Exit Entering % Shelter Pop. 
of Stay Rate Families at Point-in-Time 
 1-30 0.305 30.5% 5.2% 
31-60 0.184 12.8% 2.0% 
61-90 0.125 7.1% 1.2% 
91-120 0.105 5.2% 1.0% 
121-150 0.045 2.0% 0.3% 
151-180 0.031 1.3% 0.2% 
181-210 0.051 2.1% 0.3% 
211-240 0.072 2.8% 0.5% 
241-270 0.055 2.4% 0.3% 
271-300 0.035 1.2% 0.2% 
301-330 0.012 0.4% 0.2% 
331-360 0.058 1.9% 0.2% 
>360* 0.039 30.0% 88.5% 
Totals  100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Human Resources Administration, City of New York. 
Note: Rates are estimated for a shelter system in which all families leave only on  
their own and are based on a composite of data from families entering in June 1988  
and February 1989. 
* Assumes steady state value of 0.039, based on the average exit probability of the  
first 5 thirty day periods after 360 days. At this rate, no shelter stay would last more  
than eight years. 
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 Table 2. Effects of Allocating Resources to Time-Differentiated Users 
 A. No Allocation B. Allocation to New Entrants  C. Allocating to Long-termers
Length Month of Shelter Operation Month of Shelter Operation  Month of Shelter Operation 
of stay 13 14 15 13 14 15 13 14 15 
 1-30 69 69 69 49 49 49 69 69 69 
31-60 57 57 57 57 40 40 57 57 57 
61-90 50 50 50 50 50 35 50 50 50 
91-120 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
121-150 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
151-180 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
181-210 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
211-240 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
241-270 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
271-300 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
301-330 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
331-360 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
>360* 30 60 90 30 60 90 0 0 0 
Population 538 568 598 518 531 546 508 508 508 
 
Source: Human Resources Administration, City of New York 
Note: Table assumes 100 families enter each month. Exit rates are from New York City's family shelters. These are 
composite estimates for families who entered in February 1989 and in June 1988. Rates are probabilities that 
families would leave on their own. 
*Assumes no families leave after 360 days. 
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 Table 3.  Percent changes for number of entrants and exit rate 
(a) Average monthly percent change 
Number of entrants  Exit rate*  
Apr - Oct 1988 -4.0%  Jun - Oct 1990 -1.9%  
Apr - Oct 1989 2.7%  Jun - Oct 1991 0.7%  
Apr - Oct 1990 17.2%   
Apr - Oct 1991 -2.6%   
    
(b) Monthly percent change 
Month  Entrants Exit rate  Month  Entrants Exit rate 
Nov 1989 1.1% n.a. Nov 1990 0.1% -1.3% 
Dec 25.2% n.a. Dec -7.6% -1.2% 
Jan 0.7% n.a. Jan 18.8% -2.8% 
Feb 9.4% n.a. Feb 2.0% -1.1% 
Mar 1990 -1.0% n.a. Mar 1991 12.1% -3.3% 
Apr 17.7% n.a. Apr 4.9% -0.6% 
May 24.4% n.a. May 2.0% -0.9% 
Jun 6.4% -1.6% Jun 0.0% 0.7% 
Jul 20.8% -1.2% Jul 4.3% 0.8% 
Aug 32.9% -2.0% Aug -10.8% -0.3% 
Sept 7.6% -1.5% Sept -9.7% 0.9% 
Oct 1990 10.5% -3.2% Oct 1991 -9.1% 1.2% 
 
Source: Human Resources Administration, City of New York 
n.a.: not available     
* Exit rate is for all families leaving on their own. It does not include those  
leaving to city provided housing. 
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 Table 4. Shelter population effects of changes in number of entrants and exit rates:  
April 1990 - March 1991 
     
Effects     Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Entrants  -94 -209 -223 -336 -513 -572 -605 -600 -566 -668 -650 -714
Exit rate   57 0 -58 -99 -164 -213 -329 -362 -393 -489 -589 -672
Entrants & exit rate -40 -207 -277 -424 -658 -708 -849 -844 -807 -997 -1075 -1213
Actual census 3545 3440 3196 3223 3453 3640 3785 3833 3860 4120 4244 4450
 
Source: Human Resources Administration, City of New York 
 
Note: The number of entrants for each month was held to the same number for that month in the prior year, i.e., April 
1989 to March 1990. The exit rate was held to the average monthly rate between June 1989 and March 1990 and is 
the rate at which families left on their own. 
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